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1 Introduction
Immigration has become an extremely important issue in many developed
countries. Citizens are very concerned about the consequences of the large-
scale migration that has followed the globalization process. Immigration
is considered the most important area of concern for citizens in the UK,
Germany and Spain1. Immigration is also ranked as the top issue for citizens
in US states such as California and Arizona.2
Some of these concerns are non-economic and fall under the wide term of
xenophobia, such as fear of dilution of national identity, raise in crime rates
or introduction of new diseases. Other concerns have an economic reasoning
behind them. The two most recurrent ones are increased competition in the
labour market and the fiscal burden of immigration. Increasing numbers of
immigrants allegedly lower wages in unskilled jobs and create unemployment
among the native population. Empirical evidence on this eﬀect is mixed3.
The second concern is that immigrants might heavily rely on unemployment
and social benefits given that they are mostly unskilled and have lower
incomes. Empirical evidence on this eﬀect is also mixed. A major study
sponsored by the US National Research Council concluded that the net fiscal
cost of immigrants in California in 1994—1995 was about US$1,178 per native
household (Smith and Edmonston, 1997). On the other hand, Storesletten
(2000) shows that allowing a certain profile of migrants to enter the country
may help to sustain fiscal policy.
In this paper we address how this second potential eﬀect of immigra-
tion shapes income redistribution. More precisely, we aim to explain why
host countries devote public expenditures to cover immigrants needs even
though immigrants do not have the right to vote. We explore the idea that
redistribution towards immigrants takes place because of the possibility of
confrontation between natives and immigrants.
The possibility of such confrontation is very real. Tensions between na-
tives and immigrants are commonplace in developed countries. About a 60%
of Americans and a similar proportion of Europeans think that immigrants
cost taxpayers too much because they overuse public services4. In addition,
anti-immigration prejudices in European countries correlate positively with
poorer overall economic conditions and the size of the migrant population5.
On the other hand, marginalization of the migrant population drove the
riots in the Paris metropolitan area in 2005, in Brussels in 2006, the recent
strike of immigrants in Italy and the widespread demonstrations of the His-
1Eurobarometer 66 (2006) and Centro de Investigacion Sociologicas #2654 (2006).
2Public Policy Institute of California (2007) and Great Canyon State Poll (2005).
3See for example Borjas (2003) and Card and Shleifer (2009) for two diﬀerent results.
4Gallup Poll, June 5-July 6, 2008 (available at http://tinyurl.com/c2nzug), and the
European Social Survey of 2002 (Dustmann and Preston, 2005).
5See Quillian (1995).
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panic immigrant population in the US in 2006 and 2010. Our view is that
at the heart of all this social unrest there is a competition between natives
and immigrants to capture bigger shares of public resources.
We build up a very simple model in order to explore the role of conflict
in this relation between immigration and redistribution. We suppose that
the population is composed by immigrants and natives and that the native
population is divided between skilled and unskilled individuals that diﬀer
in their income. There exists a conflict of interests between natives and im-
migrants because public funds can be used to pay lump-sum transfers that
are group-specific. This conflict of interests is resolved through confronta-
tion: Immigrants start conflict when the payoﬀ they obtain under peace is
smaller than the payoﬀ they would obtain by resorting to confrontation. At
the same time, income inequality within the native population creates an-
other conflict of interests that is resolved through taxation. Hence, income
taxation constitutes an instrument of vertical redistribution, from the rich
to the poor, whereas the share of public funds devoted to migrants is an
instrument of horizontal redistribution6. Both the tax rate and the share
of tax revenues devoted to fund the group-specific transfers are chosen by
majority voting. Given that unskilled natives are in the majority, their pre-
ferred policies constitute the policy outcome. Immigrants cannot vote and
their only chance of altering the policy outcome is by contesting the share
of public funds they receive.
In this simple set-up, the threat of conflict shapes policy outcomes de-
spite it does not take place in equilibrium. In particular, we find that immi-
grants always receive a positive share of public expenditures. Natives prefer
to give away the minimum share of public funds that is compatible with
peace rather than precipitate a costly conflict by neglecting immigrants.
Our main result is that redistribution decreases with immigration. An
increase in the stock of migrants increases the demand for income redistrib-
ution given that immigrants bring more resources to the economy. We call
this the tax base eﬀect. But as the size of the immigrant group becomes
bigger, immigrants become more eﬀective in case of conflict and that rises
the share of public expenditures that they can obtain through confrontation.
This in turn reduces natives’ demand for income redistribution. We refer
to this as the conflict eﬀect. When the stock of immigrants is suﬃciently
large, the latter eﬀect dominates and the majority of natives prefer lower
levels of redistribution. This result is consistent with the available evidence.
Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) obtain that spending in public goods
decreases with ethnic fragmentation in US cities. Alesina, Glaeser and Sac-
erdote (2001) and Alesina and Glaeser (2004) show for a cross-section of
countries that the size of the public sector is negatively correlated with the
size of poor (often racial) minorities. Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) show
6We borrow these terms from Horowitz (1985).
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for a sample of European countries that a higher share of immigrants in the
population leads to a lower tax rate on labor income. Finally, Soroka, John-
ston and Banting (2006) show that OCDE countries with larger increases
in migrant stock had smaller increases in social spending over the period
1970-1998.
We also show that the negative eﬀect of immigration on redistribution
is softened by the degree of income inequality. As the income gap increases,
unskilled natives demand higher levels of vertical redistribution. More in-
equality makes natives, who are in average richer than immigrants, enjoy a
relatively higher capacity in case of confrontation and that makes the con-
flict eﬀect relatively less important. As a result, tax rates are higher but
the degree of horizontal redistribution, measured as the immigrants’ share of
public expenditures, decreases. This suggests that we should observe a more
restricted access of immigrants to public services in countries with higher
levels of income inequality.7
Another result that we obtain is that the welfare of both skilled and
unskilled natives increases with the stock of migrants. The reason for this
is that the resulting increase in the public budget outweighs the conflict
eﬀect. For skilled natives, this increase in welfare is even stronger due to
the lower levels of vertical redistribution that larger migrant populations
generate. This also lends support to the empirical evidence showing that
skilled natives are more pro-immigration than the unskilled ones (Dustman
and Preston 2005, Mayda 2006) and suggests that negative attitudes against
immigration, mostly held by the less wealthy, are groundless.
In the theoretical literature, Razin et al. (2002) and Lee, Roemer &
Van der Straeten (2006) also obtain that redistribution decreases with the
size of the migrant population. However, the mechanisms they consider are
diﬀerent from ours. In Razin et al. (2002), migrants qualify for all benefits in
the host country. This "fiscal leakage" make natives vote for lower income
taxes. In our case, such fiscal leakage is not assumed. Migrants can be
totally excluded from benefits but they end up not being so because they
can use conflict to alter policy outcomes. Lee et al. (2006) obtain this
"anti-solidarity eﬀect" in a model of political competition where natives
have feelings of xenophobia against migrants. This makes natives vote for
a smaller public sector despite the fact that the mean income is less than
the median income. In our model we do not need to resort to a primordial
distaste towards immigrants in order to obtain that natives prefer to reduce
redistribution. The threat of conflict is enough to generate this result.
7Access to many social benefits are quite restricted for immigrants. Eligibility criteria
vary greatly across countries and they are subject to an intense political debate. In
Germany and Sweden illegal immigrants do not have access to education whereas in the
US and Spain they do. Undocumented immigrants in the US are not eligible for health
care, Social Security or food stamps. In most EU countries, immigrants have some degree
of access to public health care.
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Our paper is also closely related with contributions that study ethnic
conflict when there exists inequality within ethnic groups. Robinson (2001)
and Esteban and Ray (2008) analyze models in which confrontation can
erupt across ethnic or class lines and study the severity and likelihood of
each of these two types of conflict. Members of the same ethnic group
can ally against the other group regardless of class. Alternatively, poor
members of each group can ally across ethnic groups against the rich. These
papers obtain that ethnic conflict is more likely to arise and is more intense
than class conflict. This result is aggravated by inequality. Esteban and
Ray (2009) study more in detail the role of within-group heterogeneity in
ethnic conflict. In these three models there is no welfare state, all income is
contestable and thus there are no policy choices and no income redistribution
as such. In our model, there is a welfare state (admittedly sketchy) and only
tax revenues are contestable because we focus on how the threat of conflict
shapes policy outcomes.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first one in analyzing a
model of conflict between social groups under policy making through ma-
jority voting. Ellman and Wantchekon (2000) study electoral competition
when one of the parties controls a source of political unrest. That party
can use this source to aﬀect the result of the election and policy making
if dissatisfied. Similarly, Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2001) show that poor
voters may prefer lower levels of redistribution in order to avoid a coup by
the rich elites. In these two papers, all group distinctions are purely eco-
nomic and conflict is not explicitly modelled. On the other hand, Gradstein
and Schiﬀ (2006) study exclusion of ethnic minorities from public education
in a dynamic framework. The ethnic minority may start a rebellion when
the level of exclusion is high enough. Our model is static but both conflict
expenditures and the level of income redistribution are endogenous. Finally,
Besley and Persson (2009) study the eﬀect of a potential civil war on the
state’s choices of fiscal and legal capacity. They endogenize conflict expen-
ditures but unlike in our case, confrontation takes place over the control of
the government. That determines the incentives of rival social groups to
invest in state building when they hold power.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Next we describe the
basic elements and assumptions of our model. In Section 3 we solve for the
equilibrium of the conflict game that takes place when immigrants contest
their share of public expenditures and in Section 4 we analyze the policy
preferences of unskilled natives. Section 5 contains the main results of the
paper. There we perform comparative statics on redistribution levels and
welfare. In Section 6, we conclude and provide some additional remarks.
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2 The Model
2.1 The case without immigrants: Consider a country populated by an
exogenously determined mass of n natives and no immigrants. There are
two types of natives, skilled (s) and unskilled (u). The size of these groups
are ns and nu respectively, and such that ns+nu = n. The most populated
group is the unskilled one, i.e. nu > ns. These groups diﬀer in their pre-tax
income levels, denoted by yi for i = s, u. It is assumed that yu < ys. The
skill premium ysyu measures the level of inequality in this society.
In addition there is a government that sets a proportional income tax τ
that all individuals must pay. Tax revenues are used to finance lump-sum
transfers. Native i’s payoﬀs are given by
U in = (1− τ)yi + gn i = s, u,
where gn is the per-capita transfer to natives.
Government uses taxes to fund transfers. Assuming budget balance, the
government budget constraint is just
(ns + nu)gn = τY,
where Y = nsys + nuyu.
Notice that because of natives’ utility functions are linear, the optimal
tax rate for skilled natives is τ = 0 whereas the optimal tax rate for unskilled
natives is τ = 1. Given the sizes of the two groups of natives, the majority
of the population would prefer total redistribution. For simplicity, we will
assume that such scenario is possible. The results of the paper still go
through if we assume a cost of taxation or a cap on the maximum tax rate
that can be set.
2.2 Immigrants: Now suppose that in addition to natives, an exogenously
determined mass m of immigrants also populate the country. Our definition
of an immigrant is a non-citizen who resides in the country either legally
or illegally, and who pays taxes but does not have the right to vote. We
assume that immigrants’ level of income is the same as for unskilled natives
and thus equal to yu. For the sake of exposition we will assume for the time
being that m ≤ ns. We will later relax this assumption.
When immigrants are present, tax revenues can also be used to finance
group-specific lump-sum transfers to them. These transfers quantify en-
hanced access to employment or to jobs in sectors dominated by natives,
aﬃrmative action policies in public employment, facilities for religious prac-
tices, access to housing or access to health services and education when
immigrants live in localized areas (ghettos or suburbs). Formally, payoﬀs
for immigrants are
Um = (1− τ)yu + gm,
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where gm is the lump-sum transfer targeted to them.
In the presence of immigrants, and assuming budget balance, the gov-
ernment budget constraint becomes
ngn +mgm = τY,
where now Y = nsys + (m+ nu)yu.
2.3 The Government: The Government implements a pair of policy in-
struments {τ , α}, where α ∈ [0, 1] is the share of the total tax revenue de-
voted to immigrants. This pair is selected by majority rule.8 Note that for
any pair {τ , α}, the budget-balanced condition fully determines the lump-
sum transfers that each group receives. That is, gm and gn are such that
mgm = ατY and ngn = (1− α)τY.
2.4 Conflict: After the pair of policies {τ , α} has been implemented, im-
migrants can decide to contest the share of the tax revenue. None of our
results would change if natives were also given the option to contest the
peaceful share of the budget. Contesting the shares implies that natives and
immigrants enter into a confrontation. Members of each group can expend
resources aimed at altering in their favor the share of the revenue that their
group receives. Examples of these activities include political demonstrations,
lobbying, campaigning and low-scale violence.
Denote by ai the expenditure in conflict by a native of type i = s, u,
and by am the expenditure of an individual immigrant. We assume that
agents cannot spend in conflict more than their after-tax income, that is,
ai ≤ (1 − τ)yi and am ≤ (1 − τ)yu. We will assume that the cost of these
expenditures is just linear.
The share of the total budget that a group can obtain through conflict
depends on the total amount of resources each of them devotes to conflict.
Denote as pm the share of the budget obtained by immigrants through con-
frontation. We follow Esteban and Ray (1999) and assume that pm takes
the following functional form:9
pm =
mam
nuau + nsas +mam
.
Note that we are assuming away the free-riding problem within groups,
but only to a certain extent: unskilled and skilled natives pool their ex-
penditures against immigrants, but they can potentially free-ride on each
other´s eﬀorts. We do this partially because the focus of our analysis is
8This choice can be supported by a standard Downsian model of political competition in
which two purely opportunistic parties propose platforms {τ , α} and commit to implement
their proposals.
9This share could also be interpreted as the probability that the immigrants obtain the
whole budget.
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not the free-riding problem and partially because we think of conflict as a
situation fundamentally diﬀerent from peace: when confrontation erupts,
individual agents stop behaving non-cooperatively and choose their conflict
expenditures in order to maximize the payoﬀ of the typical individual in
their group.
Then, the payoﬀ for members if each group in case of conflict are just:
Vi(τ) = (1− τ)yi − ai + (1− pm)
τY
n
i = s, u, (1)
Vm(τ) = (1− τ)yu − am + pm
τY
m
. (2)
Notice that α does not aﬀect agents’ utilities under conflict.
2.5 Peace: If immigrants do not contest the shares of the total budget
implemented by the government then each member of each group receives
the following payoﬀs:
Ui(τ , α) = (1− τ)yi + (1− α)
τY
n
i = s, u,
Um(τ , α) = (1− τ)yu + α
τY
m
.
Note that natives and immigrants have opposite preferences over the
share of the revenue transferred to immigrants α. In the absence of the
threat of conflict, the optimal α for any native regardless of type is α = 0.
2.6 Timing: We have so far laid down a game with the following timing:
First, government implements the pair of policy instruments {τ , α} preferred
by majority voting. Given such a policy, immigrants decide whether to
initiate conflict or not. If conflict erupts, each group decides the amount
of resources to be spent in conflict. Otherwise, they obtain the payoﬀs
corresponding to the peaceful scenario.
We will now solve the game backwards. First, we solve the conflict game
given a certain pair of policy instruments already implemented and then we
characterize the pair of policy instruments {τ , α} preferred by the majority
of the native population.
3 Equilibrium of the conflict stage
In this Section, we solve for the equilibrium of the conflict that takes place
when immigrants contest the share of the total budget they receive. In that
case, groups decide simultaneously the amount of resources they will spend
in conflict activities. In other words, they maximize (1) and (2) with respect
to ai and am respectively. It is easy to show that interior best responses are
uniquely determined by the following expressions:
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ai = pm(1− pm)
τY
n
− njaj
ni
for i = s, u and i 6= j, (3)
am = pm(1− pm)
τY
m
. (4)
Notice that eﬀorts within the natives’ group are strategic substitutes. It
is not possible for all these equations to hold simultaneously. This system
of equations will have at least one corner solution depending on the tax rate
τ . The following Proposition fully characterizes the set of Nash equilibria
of the conflict game.
Proposition 1 The Nash Equilibrium levels of conflict eﬀort are such that
immigrants spend at least as much as unskilled natives. Moreover:
(i) For low and intermediate tax rates only unskilled natives and immigrants
expend resources in conflict.
(ii) For high tax rates skilled natives expend a positive amount of eﬀort
whereas unskilled natives and immigrants expend their whole after tax
income.
(iii) For very high tax rates all individuals expend their whole after tax
income in conflict.
Immigrants spend more resources in conflict than unskilled natives be-
cause they value public transfers more. Their group is smaller so their
private benefit from capturing a bigger share of the public budget is higher.
This proposition also shows that diﬀerent levels of the tax rate yield
diﬀerent conflict eﬀorts within groups. As the tax rate increases, the capac-
ity of groups in conflict decreases because their after tax income becomes
smaller. On the other hand, the size of the budget increases as the tax
revenue grows. That in turn fuels conflict eﬀort. This implies that, for a
suﬃciently large tax rate, all groups end up spending their entire after tax
income in conflict. However, as groups are diﬀerent in terms of income and
size, this critical level of the tax rate is diﬀerent across groups.
Immigrants and unskilled natives participate in conflict for any positive
tax rate whereas skilled natives enter into conflict only for higher levels of the
tax rate. More precisely, they decide to enter into conflict once unskilled na-
tives spend their whole after tax income in conflict. This free-riding behavior
comes from the simple fact that skilled natives are richer than unskilled na-
tives, and this make them value lump-transfers relatively less.
Hence, it is possible to define four thresholds and five intervals in the
space of tax rates according to the pattern of equilibrium conflict expendi-
tures across groups. This is illustrated in the figure below.
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0 τ1  τ2 τ3 τ4 1
as* = 0 
au* < yu (1- τ) 
am* < yu (1- τ) 
as* = 0 
au* < yu (1- τ) 
am* = yu (1- τ) 
as* = 0 
au* = yu (1- τ) 
am* = yu (1- τ) 
as* < ys (1- τ) 
au* =  yu (1- τ) 
am* =  ynu (1- τ) 
as* = ys (1- τ) 
au* = yu  (1- τ) 
am * = yu (1- τ) 
Figure 1. Individuals’ Expenditures in Conflict.
Notice that when the tax rate τ is not too high, that is τ ∈ [0, τ3], skilled
natives free-ride on the conflict eﬀort made by the unskilled ones. Actually,
for very low levels of the tax rate, i.e. τ ≤ τ1, the expenditure of an unskilled
native is equal to the expenditure of an immigrant weighted by the ratio of
immigrant to native population, i.e. a∗u =
m
n a
∗
m. For larger tax rates, i.e.
τ ∈ [τ3, 1], skilled natives expend positives amount of resources in conflict.
At τ = τ4, the size of the public budget is so big that all groups expend
their whole after tax income in the confrontation.
At this point it is relevant to study the eﬀect of the tax rate on the new
shares of the tax revenues that will emerge from conflict. This will prove
helpful when analyzing the incentives of immigrants to start a confrontation.
Lemma 1 Immigrants’ equilibrium share of the public funds after conflict
p∗m is increasing in the size of the migrant group m and decreasing in the
tax rate τ .
Size gives an advantage to groups in conflict. As the stock of immigrants
increases, they are able to capture a larger share of the public funds. The
only exception occurs for very low levels of the tax rate. There the equi-
librium total expenditures of natives relative to immigrants is simply the
proportion of unskilled natives in the native population i.e. nun . This is
because of the free riding that takes place within the native coalition. This
free-riding exacerbates as the skilled group increases in size.
On the other hand, the share of public funds that immigrants receive
from conflict is weakly decreasing in the tax rate. The reason is that in-
creases in the tax rate fuel natives’ eﬀort in conflict. And given that na-
tives’ capacity in conflict is larger -both because their bigger size and bigger
income-, immigrants prospects from conflict worsen as τ increases.
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The reason why the share p∗m is not strictly increasing in τ is because it
remains constant across some regions in the space of tax rates. For instance,
for very high tax rates, i.e. τ ≥ τ4, all groups are spending their after tax
income in the contest, and the immigrants’ share of the public funds after
conflict is just equal to their income share, myuY .
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4 When Does Conflict Start?
Immigrants will initiate conflict if they can obtain a larger payoﬀ from it
than by accepting the policies implemented by the government. We have
seen in the previous section that individuals’ expenditures on conflict depend
on the level of the tax rate. Hence, individuals’ payoﬀs will also change as
τ varies. We thus need to discuss all the possible scenarios characterized in
Proposition 1.
Let us start by defining the minimum share of the public funds that will
stop immigrants from initiating conflict. That is, a α such that
Vm(τ) ≤ Um(τ , α) ⇔ (1− τ)yu + p∗m
τY
m
− a∗m ≤ (1− τ)yu + α
τY
m
,
α ≥ α(τ) ≡ p∗m −
ma∗m
τY
. (5)
The share of public funds that appeases immigrants does not need to be
as big as the share they would obtain by resorting to conflict. This is because
conflict expenditures are wasteful. Then the government is always able to
implement a policy that avoids conflict between natives and immigrants.
It is important to understand the eﬀect of the tax rate on this threshold
α(τ). Given (5), the general expression for the derivative of the minimum
share with respect to τ is
∂α(τ)
∂τ
=
∂p∗m
∂τ
+
ma∗m
Y τ2
(1− ∂a
∗
m
∂τ
τ
a∗m
)
=
∂p∗m
∂τ
+
ma∗m
Y τ2
(1 + εa(τ)).
The sign of this derivative depends critically on the immigrants’ tax-
rate elasticity of eﬀort supply, εa(τ). It is straightforward to show (see the
Appendix) that for very low levels of the tax rate, i.e. τ ≤ τ1, the equilibrium
eﬀort spent by immigrants is increasing in τ . But once they have hit their
budget constraint, the sign of the derivative becomes negative. In addition,
recall from Lemma 1 that the equilibrium share of public funds p∗m is weakly
decreasing in the tax rate. All these eﬀects create a complex behavior of
α(τ) with respect to the tax rate. The following Lemma characterizes it.
10The other regions are τ ≤ τ1, where p∗m only depends on nu and ns, and τ ∈ [τ2, τ3],
where unskilled natives and immigrants are spending their whole after-tax income.
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Lemma 2 The minimum immigrants’ share of the public funds compatible
with peace α(τ) attains two minima at τ2 and τ4.
Recall that when τ ≤ τ1, the share of public funds immigrants receive
after conflict p∗m is constant in τ . It only depends on the relative sizes of
the unskilled and skilled natives’ groups. On the other hand, immigrants’
conflict eﬀort is increasing in τ in this region. Hence, the minimum share
compatible with peace α(τ) increases with τ over this interval.
For higher tax rates, immigrants hit their budget constraint and the
minimum share of the public funds compatible with peace becomes simply
α(τ) = p∗m −
(1− τ)yum
τY
. (6)
Note that the negative term in the RHS is just the ratio between the
immigrants’ total expenditures in conflict and the size of the public budget.
As τ increases, this ratio decreases and conflict becomes relatively more
attractive. That is because although the tax rate increases public funds
under both peace and conflict, it reduces private consumption in the peaceful
scenario. We call this eﬀect the tax base eﬀect. On the other hand, recall
that immigrants’ share after conflict is weakly decreasing in τ because it
fuels natives’ expenditures. We call this the conflict eﬀect. The final eﬀect
of τ on α(τ) depends on the relative strengths of these two opposing forces.
When unskilled workers have not hit yet their budget constraint, i.e.
τ ∈ [τ1, τ2], the conflict eﬀect dominates and α(τ) is decreasing in τ . When
unskilled natives are spending their entire after tax income in conflict, i.e.
τ ∈ [τ2, τ3], the share p∗m is again constant in τ and the tax base eﬀect
dominates, that is, α(τ) is increasing in τ . That makes α(τ) attain a local
minimum at τ2. The opposite happens when skilled natives enter conflict.
In this case, higher tax rates induces natives to exert additional eﬀort in
the conflict against immigrants and the conflict eﬀect dominates again (and
α(τ) decreases with τ). Finally, when all groups are expending their after
tax income in conflict, i.e. τ ≥ τ4, the tax base eﬀect dominates again for
the same reasons as when τ ∈ [τ2, τ3], and α(τ) increases with τ . That
makes α(τ) attain another local minimum at τ4.
5 The policy outcome
5.1 The equilibrium level of redistribution
The government selects the pair of policies {τ , α} preferred by majority vot-
ing. Recall that we assume that only natives have the right to vote and
that unskilled natives are the majority. Therefore, it is enough to charac-
terize their preferences over policies {τ , α} to obtain the equilibrium policy
outcome.
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We first check whether natives prefer conflict to a situation in which
immigrants are given the minimum share that prevents them from resorting
to conflict. This might be the case if appeasing immigrants is too costly.
However, the following lemma shows that this is never the case.
Lemma 3 For any tax rate, unskilled workers maximize their utility under
peace.
The logic of this result is natural. Conflict creates a waste of resources.
This implies that for any level of the tax rate, there always exists a non-
empty range of immigrants’ shares of the tax revenue compatible with peace,
i.e. α ≥ α(τ). Then natives’ optimal level of α is equal to the minimum
level that guarantees peace, that is α = α(τ).
This Lemma implies that conflict does not actually take place in equi-
librium. However, the possibility of confrontation is enough to shape policy
outcomes. Formally, the tax rate chosen by unskilled natives is the one that
maximizes their payoﬀ in case of peace. It is characterized by the following
problem:
Max
τ
(1− τ)yu + (1− α) τYn
s.t. α = α(τ).
As we saw above, the minimum share α(τ) changes with τ in a complex
way and this makes the preferences of the unskilled natives over the in-
come tax τ to be non-trivial. The first order condition of this maximization
problem is
yum+ ns(ys − yu)− α(τ)(1 + εα(τ))Y = 0, (7)
where εα(τ) is the tax-rate elasticity of the share α(τ).
Solutions to this problem will depend critically on the skill premium and
the size of the immigrant group. This is because they determine the unskilled
natives’ demand for redistribution. The following Proposition shows that the
set of potential optimal tax rates for unskilled natives, and thus of potential
policy outcomes, reduces to just two.
Proposition 2 There exist two possible policy outcomes, {τ4, α(τ4)} and
{1, α(1)}, where
τ4 ≡
n
n+ ns mm+nu+ns ysyu
.
Moreover, {τ4, α(τ4)} is the policy outcome if and only if
m > m∗ = ns(
ys
yu
− 1). (8)
13
The optimal tax rate for unskilled workers naturally depends on the
threat of conflict. On the one hand, when the threat of conflict by immi-
grants is low, as in the extreme case of m = 0, total redistribution, i.e.
τ = 1, is the optimal policy for unskilled workers. We know from Lemma 2
that the minimum immigrants’ share of tax revenue compatible with peace
attains minima at tax rates τ2 and τ4. This makes these tax rates very
attractive to unskilled natives. However, Proposition 2 proves that τ4 is
always preferred to τ2 by unskilled workers.
Condition (8) shows that the number of migrants and the skill premium
determine which tax rate is finally chosen. Next we perform comparative
statics on these parameters in order to generate additional predictions.
5.2 Comparative statics
5.2.1 Stock of immigrants: We have seen that the threat of conflict is
positively correlated with the size of the immigrant population. Therefore,
it can be expected that in countries with a large migrant population, lower
levels of redistribution should be observed as compared to countries with a
smaller migrant population. The following Proposition demonstrates this.
Proposition 3 The equilibrium tax rate τ∗ is decreasing in the number of
immigrants m, whereas the equilibrium share α is strictly increasing in m∗.
The intuition for this result is easy to grasp: As the number of immi-
grants increases, they become more eﬀective in conflict (the conflict eﬀect).
The share of the public funds they can capture becomes bigger, that is, α
increases. The majority of the native population finds redistribution less
attractive because maintaining peace becomes now too costly. That pushes
the equilibrium tax rate τ down.
It remains an open question how an increase in the stock of migrants
aﬀect the welfare of natives and immigrants. For natives, an increase in
number of immigrants increases the tax base but at the same time it makes
the immigrant group more eﬀective in confrontation. For immigrants, the
conflict eﬀect is positive but the per capita value of transfers decreases as
they become more numerous. The following Proposition characterizes the
final eﬀect of an increase in m on the welfare of each group.
Proposition 4 The equilibrium payoﬀ is increasing in m for both types of
natives, and it is decreasing in m for immigrants.
This result is partially driven by the relationship between the equilib-
rium tax rate τ and the stock of migrants m described in Proposition 2.
Unskilled natives benefit from a bigger migrant population because the tax
base eﬀect dominates over the conflict eﬀect and despite vertical redistrib-
ution lowers. On the other hand, skilled natives benefit even more because
14
they benefit from the reduction in the tax rate that an increase in the stock
of migrants brings. Finally, immigrants are harmed by the decrease in the
tax rate and by their bigger numbers. This leaves them worse oﬀ despite
the conflict eﬀect works in their favour.
5.2.2 Skill premium: Let us now see how the equilibrium level of redis-
tribution changes as the skill premium ysyu varies.
Expression (8) shows that the threshold number of immigrants needed
for the shift in tax rates to take place increases with the skill premium.
This suggests that increases in income inequality should temper the negative
eﬀect of migration on the levels of redistribution. Still, we need to check
how τ4 changes with
ys
yu
: Redistribution should ceteris paribus become more
attractive for unskilled natives as the skill premium increases. The following
Proposition confirms this intuition.
Proposition 5 The equilibrium level of the tax rate τ is weakly increasing
with respect to the skill premium ysyu , whereas the equilibrium share α is
strictly decreasing in ysyu .
The force driving this result is the following. An increase in the skill
premium increases the capacity of natives in conflict relative to immigrants’
and the threat of conflict becomes less intense, that is, the share of public
funds they can obtain through conflict decreases with ysyu . Natives find less
costly to avoid conflict and this in turn increases the demand for redistri-
bution. As a result, the equilibrium tax rate τ is higher for any level of
the stock of migrants m. At the same time, this extra relative strength of
natives in case of conflict reduces α. In more unequal societies then, hor-
izontal redistirbution, measured as the share of public funds allocated to
immigrants, is lower.
5.2.3 More migrants than skilled natives. One assumption in the analy-
sis above was that the stock of immigrants was not bigger than the size of
the group of skilled natives. When immigrants are no longer the minority
group, i.e. m > ns, then it can be the case that an even lower level of redis-
tribution may be the equilibrium outcome. In addition to τ = 1 and τ4, the
tax rate τ2 can also be the policy outcome. It is not possible to characterize
analytically the region of the parameter space in which this is the case. The
figure below illustrates this with a numerical example.
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Figure 2. Equilibrium levels of redistribution when nsnu = 0.3.
Numerical analysis suggests that this third tax rate is more likely to
emerge as the stock of immigrants becomes bigger and as the skill premium
ys
yu
becomes smaller. This two forces go in the same direction: the threat
of immigrants become more intense and inequality decreases, thus reducing
the demand for redistribution.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have presented a model that relates the latent conflict
between natives and immigrants to the level of redistribution observed in
democracies. Whereas taxation can resolve the vertical conflict of interests
between the poor and the rich, confrontation takes place when migrants are
discontent with the share of public expenditures they receive. We believe
that this latent conflict is at the root of the examples of immigrant unrest
experienced in Europe and the US in the last few years.
Our main results concern how the threat of such a conflict between im-
migrants and natives shapes income redistribution. First, the possibility of
conflict grants immigrants a positive share of public expenditures. Natives
prefer to give away the minimum share of public funds that is compatible
with peace rather than precipitate a costly conflict by neglecting immigrants.
This is consistent with the observation that host countries devote public ex-
penditures to cover immigrants needs even though immigrants do not have
the right to vote. An alternative explanation for this observation might be
that citizens of the host country genuinely care about the welfare of the mi-
grant population. Here, we obtain positive public spending on immigrants
even when natives hold purely egoistic preferences.
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We then study how the level of income redistribution changes with in-
creases in the stock of immigrants. More migrants increase the demand for
vertical redistribution because more resources enter the system. But at the
same time the immigrants group becomes more eﬀective in case of conflict
and that rises the minimum share of public expenditures compatible with
peace. This in turn reduces the demand for income redistribution. When
the stock of immigrants is suﬃciently large, the latter eﬀect dominates and
the majority of natives prefer lower levels of redistribution. This result is
very much in line with a large amount of empirical evidence on the relation
between public spending and immigration.
We also show that this negative eﬀect of immigration on redistribution
is softened by the degree of income inequality because as the income gap
increases, unskilled natives prefer higher levels of taxation. But at the same
time, more inequality makes natives become relatively stronger in conflict
and that reduces horizontal redistribution. This suggests that more unequal
countries should exclude immigrant more from public services. Finally, we
show that despite the possibility of conflict, natives both skilled and un-
skilled are better oﬀ with larger migrant populations. For skilled natives
this increase in welfare is even stronger due to the lower levels of vertical
income redistribution. This is consistent with the evidence showing that
attitudes towards immigration are more positive among the more educated.
Admittedly our model is very stripped down. This is because we want
to identify a particular mechanism that relates immigration with policy out-
comes. Here, we do not consider for instance the possible eﬀect of immi-
grants in natives’ labour income. Some empirical evidence shows that im-
migration aﬀects wages by rising the skill premium (Borjas, 2003). That in
turn can also explain why attitudes towards immigration are more positive
among the skilled. It is possible to extend to our model to include this eﬀect.
If an increase in the stock of immigrants also aﬀects the skill premium in a
positive way, our results suggest that the negative eﬀect of immigration on
income redistribution should soften.
Finally, another caveat of our model is that it is static. It does not take
in to account the eﬀects of future possible enfranchisement of immigrants.
In a recent paper, Ortega (2009) compares pure temporary migration (with
no access to the right to vote) and permanent migration (with access to
the right to vote) in a dynamic model where both income redistribution
and the number of immigrants are chosen by majority vote. He finds that,
in the long run, income redistribution is only supported under permanent
migration. Introducing the eﬀect of potential conflict in this setting could
be an interesting line of future research. More generally, we plan to tackle
the study of the enfranchisement of immigrants in our future research.
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A Appendix
Proof of Proposition1. From (3) and given that nu > ns we can see
that if the FOC for the unskilled natives holds, then the skilled workers
want to exert zero conflict eﬀort. If on the other hand, the FOC for skilled
natives holds then unskilled ones want to spend their entire after tax income
in conflict. Let us consider the former case. If as = 0 then from (3) and (4)
we have that
au
am
=
m
n
,
and by substituting in any of the two previous FOCs we obtain
a∗m =
nu
(n+ nu)2
n
m
τY, (9)
a∗u =
nu
(n+ nu)2
τY.
From here we see that immigrants spend more in conflict than unskilled
natives. Moreover, expenditures increase as the tax rate τ increases. That
is because in this case taxes enlarge the prize groups are fighting for. When
τ >
mym(n+ nu)2
nunY +mym(n+ nu)2
≡ τ1
immigrants hit their budget constraint and a∗m = (1 − τ)yu. In this case,
unskilled workers will spend
a∗u =
1
nu
(
r
m(1− τ)yunu
τY
n
−m(1− τ)yu), (10)
that is positive when τ > τ1. Again, it may be the case that this level of
expenditure exceeds the after tax income of the individual. That happens
if and only if
τ >
nym(m+ nu)2
numY + nym(m+ nu)2
≡ τ2.
Tedious but straightforward calculus shows that τ2 > τ1.
Once immigrants and unskilled natives are hitting their budget con-
straints, skilled natives may or may not spend a positive amount of conflict
eﬀort. That will be determined by the solution to their FOC, that is
a∗s =
p
(1− τ)yu
ns
(
r
nsmτY
n
− (nu +m)
p
(1− τ)yu). (11)
Skilled natives will exert positive conflict eﬀort only if this solution is posi-
tive, which holds true if and only if
τ >
n(nu +m)2yu
nsmY + n(nu +m)2yu
≡ τ3,
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that is clearly greater than τ2.
The last case that remains to be checked occurs when the solution to
(11) hits the budget constraint of the skilled native. That is the case when
τ >
nY
nY +mnsyu
≡ τ4,
which is greater than τ3. Above that tax rate, all agents in the economy will
use their entire after tax income in conflict in case it erupts.
Proof of Lemma 1. When τ < τ1, the winning probability of immigrants
is simply
pm1 =
n
n+ nu
,
that is independent from τ . When τ ∈ (τ1, τ2), immigrants hit their budget
constraint. In that case, their probability of victory is:
pm2 =
s
nm(1− τ)yu
nuτY
,
that is decreasing in τ and increasing inm. For intermediate levels of the tax
rate, both the unskilled natives and immigrants expend the whole after tax
income but skilled natives still do not participate. In that case, immigrants’
probability of victory is just:
pm3 =
m
nu +m
.
When τ ∈ (τ3, τ4), skilled natives participate in conflict and spend part
after-tax income. Immigrants winning probability in the former case is
pm4 =
s
nm(1− τ)yu
nsτY
.
Finally, for very high levels of τ , all groups spend their entire after tax
income in conflict and the winning probability of immigrants becomes equal
to their income share, that is,
pm5 =
mym
Y
.
Proof of Lemma 2. Let us start with the case of very low taxes. Here
skilled natives do not exert any eﬀort and the equilibrium expenditures
of unskilled natives and immigrants do not exceed their after tax income.
Immigrants start conflict if and only if:
(1− τ)yu +
µ
n
n+ nu
¶2 τY
m
> (1− τ)yu + α
τY
m
.
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Simplifying this, we rewrite the previous expression as:
α < α1 ≡ (pm1)2 =
µ
n
n+ nu
¶2
,
that does not depend on τ . When τ ∈ (τ1, τ2), immigrants will engage in
confrontation if:
pm2
τY
m
> (1− τ)yu + α
τY
m
.
Simplifying this, we rewrite the previous expression as:
α < α2 ≡ pm2(1− pm2
nu
n
).
∂α2
∂τ
=
∂pm2
∂τ
(1− 2pm2
nu
n
).
Given that ∂pm2∂τ is always negative, the sign of the derivative is determined
by the sign of the second term. This term is increasing in τ and it is positive
evaluated at τ = τ1, because at this point pm2 = pm1 = nn+nu . Hence, α2
strictly decreases with τ in the interval [τ1, τ2].
In the region [τ1, τ2], immigrants will engage in confrontation if:
τY
nu +m
> (1− τ)yu + α
τY
m
.
Simplifying this, we rewrite the previous expression as:
α < α3 ≡ pm3(1−
1− τ
τ
(nu +m)yu
Y
).
Given that pm3 is constant in τ , it is straightforward to see that α3 is in-
creasing. Hence, α(τ) attains a local minimum at τ2.
The next case correspond to the scenario in which both unskilled natives
and immigrants exhaust their income and skilled natives spend part of theirs.
There, immigrants start conflict if:
α < α4 ≡ pm4(1− pm4
ns
n
).
∂α4
∂τ
=
∂pm4
∂τ
(1− 2pm4
ns
n
).
Given that ∂pm4∂τ is always negative, the sign of this derivative is determined
by the sign of the second term. This term is increasing in τ and it is positive
evaluated at τ = τ3. Hence, it remains positive in this region and we can
conclude that α4 is decreasing in τ . This also implies that α(τ3) is a local
maximum.
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The last case occurs when τ > τ4. In that region, the minimum share
that must be allocated to immigrants is
α < α5 ≡ pm5
2τ − 1
τ
,
that is increasing in τ . Hence, α(τ) attains another local minimum at τ4.
Proof of Lemma 3. The utility level for unskilled workers in case of
peace is higher than under conflict if and only if for any τ :
(1− τ)yu + (1− α(τ))
τY
n
> (1− τ)yu + (1− pm)
τY
n
− au ⇔
au > (α(τ)− pm)
τY
n
.
Notice that by definition of α(τ) (see 5) we have that α(τ) < pm for any
am > 0. Since am ≥ au then the inequality above is satisfied for any τ .
Proof of Proposition 2. The general expression for the derivative of the
objective function is
∂uun(α, τ)
∂τ
= yum+ ns(ys − yu)− α(τ)(1 + εα(τ))Y.
In the region where τ < τ1, the derivative of this function with respect to
the tax rate is
∂uun(α1, τ)
∂τ
= −yu + nu
2n+ nu
(n+ nu)2
Y
n
,
which is either positive or negative. This implies that maxima in this region
can be attained either at τ = 0 or τ1.
When τ ∈ [τ1, τ2], the derivative of the payoﬀ with respect to τ is more
involved:
∂uun(α2, τ)
∂τ
= −yu
m+ n
n
+
Y
n
− 1− 2τ
2
p
(1− τ)τ
r
myuY
nun
,
which is itself increasing in τ . Let us evaluate this derivative at the extremes
of the interval:
∂uun(α2, τ)
∂τ
¯¯¯¯
τ=τ1
= ys
ns
ns + nu
(
ns + 3nu
2(ns + 2nu)
)
+
yu
ns + nu
(
(ns + 3nu)(m+ nu)
2(ns + 2nu)
+
m(ns + 2nu)
2nu
− (m+ ns + nu)),
which is positive if and only if
ys
yu
>
2(ns + 2nu)(m+ nu + ns)
ns(ns + 3nu)
− m+ nu
ns
− m(ns + 2n
u)2
nsnu(ns + 3nu)
.
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On the other hand, the derivative evaluated at τ = τ2 is
∂uun(α1, τ)
∂τ
¯¯¯¯
τ=τ2
=
yu
nu + ns
nsm+ nu(nu − ns)
2nu
+
ns
nu + ns
m+ 2nu
2(m+ nu)
ys > 0.
This means that depending on the value of the skill premium, the payoﬀ for
unskilled natives will either attain a minimum or will be increasing in this
region. The local maximum will be located then in one of the two extremes,
i.e. τ1 or τ2.
Let us show now that τ1 is dominated by τ2 for any m < n. The payoﬀ
function evaluated at τ1 is
uun(α(τ1), τ1) = (1− τ1)yu + nu
2n+ nu
(n+ nu)2
τ1Y
n
= yu
nu
nu +m
(2nu+ns)2
(nu+ns)
yu
Y
(1 +
m
nu + ns
nu
nu + ns
+
2m
nu + ns
),
whereas on the other hand, the payoﬀ when τ = τ2 boils down to
uun(α(τ1), τ1) = yu(
nu
nu + (nu + ns)
(m+nu)2
m
yu
Y
)(1 +
m
nu + ns
+
m+ nu
m
),
so proving the lemma amounts to prove that
nu
nu+m
(2nu+ns)2
(nu+ns)
yu
Y
nu
nu+(nu+ns)
(m+nu)2
m
yu
Y
≤
1 + mnu+ns +
m+nu
m
1 + mnu+ns
nu
nu+ns
+ 2mnu+ns
⇔
num(n+m) + n(m+ nu)2
nnu(m+ n) +m(n+ nu)2
≤ nm+m
2 + n(m+ nu)
n2 + num+ 2mn
⇔
−m2(n+m)(n+ nu) + n(m+ nu)[(n+ 2m)(m+ nu)− (n+m)nu]
+m(m+nu)[nu(m+nu)−(n+nu)2] < 0⇔
m[(nu − n)(nu + n)− n(m+ nu)] + n(2m− nu)(m+ nu) < 0⇔
−(n−m)[(nu)2 +mn] < 0.
In the third region, i.e. τ ∈ [τ2, τ3], the derivative of the payoﬀ function is
given by
∂uun(α3, τ)
∂τ
= −yu
m+ n
n
+
Y
n
nu
nu +m
.
The sign is either positive or negative so the maxima can be again located
only at the extremes of the region.
In the fourth case the derivative of the payoﬀ with respect to τ is almost
identical to the one for the second region:
∂uun(α4, τ)
∂τ
= −yu
m+ n
n
+
Y
n
− 1− 2τ
2
p
(1− τ)τ
r
myuY
nsn
,
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that is again increasing in τ . The analysis is now less intricate because
∂uun(α4, τ)
∂τ
¯¯¯¯
τ=τ3
= yu
nu(nu +m) + ns(nu − 2ns)
ns
+ ns
2nu +m
nu +m
ys > 0,
which means that the derivative is positive in the whole interval [τ3, τ4]
and the payoﬀ attains a maximum at τ = τ4. Note that discards τ3 as a
candidate for global maximum.
The last case that needs to be considered occurs at τ > τ4, where the
derivative of the unskilled natives’ payoﬀ is:
∂uun(α5, τ)
∂τ
= −yu
m+ ns
ns + nu
+ ys
ns
ns + nu
> 0⇔
ys
yu
>
m+ ns
ns
.
This implies that τ = 1 is preferred to τ4 if and only if
m <
ns(ys − yu)
yu
.
Observe also that
uun(α1, 0) = yu <
nu
n
yu +
ns
n
ys = uun(α5, 1),
which implies that τ = 0 cannot be a global maximum.
Finally, let us prove that for any combination of skilled premium and a
native and immigrant populations, τ4 is always preferred to τ2 by unskilled
workers. The utility levels when taxes are τ2 and τ4 are correspondingly:
uun(α2, τ2) =
[(nu + ns)(2m+ nu) +m2]yunu((nu +m)yu + nsys)
(nu + ns)(num((nu +m)yu + nsys) + (nu + ns)yu(m+ nu)2)
uun(α4, τ4) =
((nu +m)yu + nsys)(nu + ns)[nuyu + nsys] +mn(yu)2[m+ nu + ns]
(nu + ns)[(nu + ns)((nu +m)yu + nsys) +mnsyu]
.
For the sake of simplicity we can normalize nu = 1 and yu = 1 such that
ns, m and ys become the proportion of skilled to unskilled population, the
proportion of immigrants to unskilled workers, and the skill premium, re-
spectively. Therefore ns ∈ (0, 1), m ∈ (0, 1) and ys > 1. We obtain that
uun(α4, τ4) > u
u
n(α4, τ4) if and only if:
(1+m)2(m+ns)(ns−1)+(1+m)(2+(m−2)ns)nsys+(3+m(3+ns))(nsys)2+(nsys)3 > 0.
Notice that the function above is increasing in ys. Then if the above inequal-
ity is satisfied for any ns ∈ (0, 1), m ∈ (0, 1)and ys > 1 it is also satisfied for
any ns ∈ (0, 1), m ∈ (0, 1)and ys = 1. Then, uun(α4, τ4) > uun(α4, τ4) if:
(1 +m+ ns)2(m(ns − 1) + ns) > 0⇔
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(m(ns − 1) + ns) > 0.
But the inequality above is always satisfied since ns > m and ns ∈ (0, 1),
m ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, for any combination of skilled premium and a native
and immigrant populations, τ4 is always preferred to τ2 by unskilled workers.
Therefore there are only two possible optimal taxes for unskilled workers,
τ4 and τ = 1,and τ4 is the global maximum if and only if :
m >
ns(ys − yu)
yu
.
Proof of Proposition 3. First, let us prove that for every level of the
skill premium and composition of native population there exists a critical
number of migrants m∗ < n such that for m ≥ m∗ such that τ4 is preferred
to τ = 1 by unskilled workers. Notice that if ysyu ≤ R(m) ≡
m
ns
+ 1 then τ4
is preferred to τ = 1 by. Since R(m) is increasing in m this function attains
a minimum at m = 0 such that R(0) = 1. Then for any m > 0 there exist a
skilled premium and a native population such that the total redistribution
is not the optimal policy.
Second, in order to prove that the optimal tax for unskilled workers is
weakly decreasing in m, we have to prove that τ4 is weakly decreasing in m.
But this is true since:
∂τ4
∂m
=
−nyuns(nsys + nuyu)
(nY +mnsyu)2
< 0.
Let us also check how the minimum shares α(τ4) and α(1) change with the
stock of migrants:
∂α(1)
∂m
=
nu + nsys
(m+ nu + nsys)2
> 0
∂α(τ4)
∂m
=
∂pm4
∂m
(1− 2pm4
ns
n
) > 0,
where the last inequality holds from the facts that ∂pm4∂m > 0 and that pm4 <
1
2 . Hence, the level of horizontal redistribution increases with the stock of
migrants.
Proof of Proposition 4. For the sake of simplicity we can normalize
nu = 1 and yu = 1 such that ns, m and ys become the proportion of skilled
to unskilled population, the proportion of immigrants to unskilled workers,
and the skill premium, respectively. Therefore ns ∈ (0, 1), m ∈ (0, 1) and
ys > 1.
Let us first check weather unskilled natives are better oﬀ under an in-
crease in m. Notice that when τ = 1 is the optimal tax rate for unskilled
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workers their payoﬀ is constant in m. However, it is not the case when τ4
is the optimal tax rate for unskilled natives.
∂Uu(τ4, α4)
∂m
=
m2(1 + 2ns) + (1 + ns)(1 + nsys)(2m− ns(ys − 1))
(1 + ns) (1 +m+ ns + 2mns + ns(1 + ns)ys)
2 > 0,
since m > m∗ = ns(ys − 1) > 0.
Second, for the case of the skilled natives, it easy to see that when τ = 1
is implemented their payoﬀ is also constant in m. In additions given that:
Us(τ4, α4) = Uu(τ4, α4) + (1− τ4)(ys − 1).
Therefore ∂Us(τ4,α4)∂m >
∂Uu(τ4,α4)
∂m > 0 because τ4 is decreasing in m.
Finally for immigrants it is also easy to see that when τ = 1 is imple-
mented their utility is also constant in m. When when τ4 is implemented
the payoﬀ for immigrants is just
Um(τ4, α4) =
(1 + ns)
(1 + ns) + mns(1+m)+nsys
.
It straightforward to see that the denominator is increasing in m and then
∂Uu(τ4,α4)
∂m < 0.
Proof of Proposition 5. We have to prove that τ4 is increasing in
ys
yu
. For the sake of simplicity we can normalize nu = 1 and yu = 1 such
that ns, m and ys become the proportion of skilled to unskilled population,
the proportion of immigrants to unskilled workers, and the skill premium,
respectively. Then we have that:
∂τ4
∂ys
=
ns(ns + 1)[(ns + 1)(1 +m+ nsys) +mns]− ns(ns + 1)[(ns + 1)(1 +m+ nsys)]
[(ns + 1)(1 +m+ nsys)]2
=
=
m(ns)2(ns + 1)
[(ns + 1)(1 +m+ nsys)]2
> 0.
Let us also check how the minimum shares α(τ4) and α(1) change with
the skill premium:
∂α(1)
∂ys
= − ns
(m+ nu + nsys)2
< 0
∂α(τ4)
∂ys
=
∂pm4
∂ys
(1− 2pm4
ns
n
) < 0,
where the last inequality holds from the fact that ∂pm4∂ys < 0 and that pm4 <
1
2 .
Hence, the level of horizontal redistribution decreases with the skill pre-
mium.
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